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Book reviews/new research
Book review: David Lewis, ed., Building New Competition Law Regimes: Selected Essays, Edward Elgar, 2013 (ISBN: 978-1-78195-372-3)
Book review: David Lewis, ed., Building New Competition Law Regimes: Selected Essays, Edward Elgar, 2013 (ISBN: 978-1-78195-372-3) Review by Mel Marquis, European University Institute, Florence   Mexico, Hungary, South Africa, Thailand and Zambia are featured in this collection. Each country has a story to tell that is partly unique but also partly similar to those of other countries that have undergone the difficult task of introducing a competition law ethos and competition law institutions where there were essentially none before. I can start with a small criticism, which is that a horizontal chapter of lessons, for both new and old jurisdictions, might have served to unify the chapters. But as compensation for this apparent omission, the book contains two bonus chapters, one on international antitrust problems and institutional responses, and one on regional agreements with competition provisions. A particularly thoughtful chapter on the evolution of competition law and enforcement in Hungary is provided by Csaba Kovács and Andreas Reindl. They fully explore the international influences (with interesting perspectives on Hungary’s accession process and the mixture of ‘reception’ and selective adaptation of EU norms), the domestic political economy and the inter-institutional struggles that have shaped the GVH in its two-decade history. Although one of the authors is a GVH fellow and former long-time official, the chapter does not fail to acknowledge the authority’s
Book reviews/new research
New edited book: Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2014)
Philip Lowe and Mel Marquis, eds., Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies (Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing, 2014) Many readers of this blog will be familiar with a long-running string of books on competition law published by Hart, the European Competition Law Annual series, which I edit with Philip Lowe. The most recent edition of the Annual was published this week. The book can be ordered at the following webpage:  http://www.hartpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?ISBN=9781849463515 At the moment, it is available in hardback and it will also be published as an e-book.   The book contains papers presented at the 16th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, which I organized with Philip at the European University Institute in Florence on 17-18 June 2011. On that occasion the group discussed the use of private rights of action before national courts, and the prospects for legislation and soft law initiatives at the level of the EU. My original plan to time the publication of the Annual so that it followed the Commission’s publication of a legislative proposal was jeopardized when certain controversies about the scope, contours and ‘horizontality’ of the package held up that process. The book nearly went ahead without the possibility to react to any such proposal. But – just this side of the point of no return, the
Cartels
AG Opinion in Kone: EU ‘Effectiveness’ Law Wades Further into National Civil Litigation
I recently stressed that the EU Damages Directive will not be a normative island; it will interact with a swelling body of preliminary rulings under Article 267 TFEU (‘Perchance to Dream’, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2371338). One case to watch closely will be Case C-557/12, Kone and others. On 30 January 2014, Advocate General Kokott delivered her Opinion. If the ECJ follows her, the judgment will affect antitrust litigation before national courts in Europe because (i) it will harmonize certain principles governing damages actions, and (ii) it will imply greater potential exposure to damages relative to a contrary outcome. The question submitted by Austria’s Supreme Court, the Oberster Gerichtshof, was this: “Is Article 101 TFEU […] to be interpreted as meaning that any person may claim from members of a cartel damages also for the loss which he has been caused by a person not party to the cartel who, benefiting from the protection of the increased market prices, raises his own prices for his products more than he would have done without the cartel (umbrella pricing), so that the principle of effectiveness laid down by the Court of Justice of the European Union requires grant of a claim under national law?” So: can a plaintiff recover damages from cartelists for an overcharge even if it is not imposed by the defendants but by a non-colluder