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Distributive Effects in the Competition Policy in the Framework of Administrative Enforcement
Russian competition enforcement is among the most active in the world [Avdasheva, Kryuchkova, 2013]. At the same time the Russian competition agency has recently been criticized for the predominance of quantitative outcomes over qualitative (extremely high number of cases, many of which, after analysis, are irrelevant to competition law protection) and for weak economic analysis [Girgenson, Numerova, 2012]. One recent trend of the Russian competition policy development is an enthusiasm about ex-ante norms of practice in certain industries. During the last few years, industry-specific rules were developed. They include e.g. the Law On the Fundamentals of the Regulation of Trade (2009), a Code of Fair Practices in the Groceries-Suppliers Contracts (2012), the Automakers’ Code of Conduct (2013). Along with sector-specific laws commercial practices (as well as detailed regulations of contract terms) they became a typical part of behavioural remedies in merger cases as well as in decisions on abuse of dominance. The number of cases on abuse of dominance (thousands annually) is decreasing only because of the increasing number of warning letters that have been issued by the competition authorities (between one and two thousand annually). All these specific features of the Russian competition law enforcement are closely interrelated. Under administrative procedural rules in force, a significant share of cases is inspired by the complaints of alleged victims of anti-competitive practices. Such a